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As private plant breeding replaces public programs, the efﬁcient provision and
utilisation of key enabling technologies for crop breeding, which are largely
knowledge based and provide the foundation for variety improvement, might be at
risk. Typically, such inputs are non-rival in use and are therefore termed essential
plant breeding infrastructure (EPBI). Speciﬁc threats include the possibility of
wasteful duplication in production, under-production, under-utilisation of produced
EPBI because of price rationing, and anticompetitive outcomes in plant breeding
and downstream markets. The likely level of under-investment in hypothetical
molecular-marker technology by a proﬁt-maximising monopoly producer, charging





Interactions between advances in scientiﬁc knowledge, changes in the legal
framework for intellectual property rights, and competitive forces in the
market are driving economic outcomes in the ‘plant breeding industry’.
Opportunities to create value in the supply chain arising from scientiﬁc dis-
coveries provide powerful incentives for ﬁrms to invest in plant breeding.
More or less concurrently, the capacity to appropriate a sizeable share of
the beneﬁts from the intellectual capital embedded in improved varieties
has been enhanced by signiﬁcant extensions to intellectual property rights.
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Together, these developments have unleashed competitive forces that are
likely to transform the production of new plant varieties. For many broadacre
crops in Australia, a transition is well underway from a crop breeding system
dominated by public programs, to one in which private plant breeding
plays a much more important role. Moreover, even if public and/or grower
funded plant breeding programs survive for some crops; they also will be
under pressure to operate more commercially, and to recover at least some of
the costs of the breeding program (as distinct from costs of seed multiplica-
tion) by charging growers more for newly released varieties.
A more commercially orientated and competitive system of crop breeding
will bring many beneﬁts to grain growers, but there also will be challenges





 The topic of the present paper is the possible impact of a
more privatised crop breeding system on the efﬁcient provision of breeding
technologies, and related ‘knowledge rich’ inputs to plant breeding, that
provide the crucial foundation for ongoing variety improvement. For con-
venience, such inputs will be referred to as key enabling technologies.
Effectively, most key enabling technologies are non-rival in use by com-
peting plant breeders because they are largely knowledge based. Where
knowledge is embedded in a tangible technology, the use of which requires
consumables that are rival in use, the knowledge component of such tech-
nology is still non-rival in use. In effect, the knowledge component enables
a capacity to practice the technology that is unlimited, and hence non-rival
in use. For reasons to be discussed in following text, this capacity to prac-
tice key enabling technologies will be referred to as essential plant breeding
infrastructure (EPBI).
In the past, most key enabling technologies for plant breeding have been
non-proprietary as provision has been predominantly publicly funded.
Consequently, they have been non-excludable as well as largely non-rival in
use, which are the two attributes that distinguish true public goods.
Arguably, these admirable arrangements are unlikely to survive the priva-
tisation of the plant breeding industry. Current funding sources for the provi-
sion and further development of key enabling technologies are already under
threat. As a result, public agencies might abandon such activity to the private
sector, and/or might seek to recover some or all of the cost by charging plant
breeders for access to these technologies. This is likely to hasten an emerging
trend toward greater application of intellectual property rights to breeding
technologies as well as to germplasm, and to the commercialisation and pos-
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If key enabling technologies are proprietary or otherwise price excludable,
then they belong to a class of goods variously referred to as joint goods, ‘club
goods’, or simply excludable public goods. The stimulus to inventive activity
provided by the patent system demonstrates that private provision of exclud-
able public goods has some potential advantages vis-à-vis public provision of
pure public goods. However, there also are threats to the efﬁcient provision and
utilisation of EPBI that need to be addressed if the potential beneﬁts from some
form of privatised provision of key enabling technologies are to be fully realised.
As private plant breeding replaces public programs, there are at least four
identiﬁable threats to the efﬁcient provision and utilisation of EPBI. First,
is the possibility of wasteful duplication in their production as private
plant breeding ﬁrms strive for competitive advantage in the market place.
Second, is the risk that the incentives for private investment will be inadequate
for it to substitute fully for the likely withdrawal of public funding. Third,
increasingly prevalent attempts to maintain the incentive for adequate
investment in the development of key enabling technologies by protecting
and charging for their use will almost inevitably result in inefﬁcient under-
utilisation of EPBI as a result of price exclusion. Finally, monopoly provi-
sion of enabling technologies may result in anti-competitive outcomes in
downstream markets unless there are access regimes to ensure that the
potential beneﬁts from competition among plant breeders are fully realised.
A number of examples of key enabling technologies for plant breeding
are reviewed in the next section, together with some of the causal changes
behind the emerging trend to privatisation in the plant breeding industry.
This is followed by a discussion of the policy issues that need to be
addressed to ensure that the potential beneﬁts to grain growers from these
trends are realised. An analysis of the likely level of under-production of
EPBI by a proﬁt maximising monopoly provider constrained to charging a
uniform price for access to EPBI precedes the concluding section.
 
2. Key enabling technologies and the trend to privatisation of plant breeding
 
Historically, most crop breeding in Australia was conducted by ‘public’
research organisations that were ﬁnanced mainly from government revenue.
Publicly ﬁnanced agencies, including state government Departments of
Agriculture, universities and CSIRO, also carried out supporting research
in agronomy, plant pathology, entomology, biometry, plant nutrition, plant
physiology and cognate disciplines. These programs produced enabling know-
ledge and technology for plant breeding that has underpinned much of the
productivity growth of modern plant breeding, and provided the foundation
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Prime examples of enabling technologies of long standing are the collec-
tion and conservation of germplasm, including both land-race and elite
breeding lines, marker assisted selection, and hybrid technology. Results of
prebreeding research in such diverse ﬁelds as agronomy, biometry, entomo-
logy, plant pathology and quarantine, plant physiology, product chemistry,
and quantitative genetics, have led to greater potential for value creation by
improvements in plant breeding methods.
More recently, the application of modern science, and in particular of
molecular biology and information technology, to plant breeding has dra-
matically increased the potential to create extra value in the grain supply
chain. New plant breeding methods such as dihaploidy, plant regeneration
systems such as embryo rescue, and rapid breeding cycles have sped up the
development of new varieties and reduced breeding costs. Furthermore,
information and database systems together with molecular marker techno-
logy have enabled breeders to be much more selective and effective at iden-
tifying desirable traits in germplasm collections and incorporating these
traits into elite lines, while transformation technologies have signiﬁcantly
expanded the range of traits that plant breeders can access.
Use of these techniques in conventional plant breeding is already reducing
the time lags from initial crosses to release of new varieties, reducing the
cost of development of improved crop varieties, and enabling the development
of superior improved crop varieties that are more productive, produce better
quality grain or both. In addition, there has been the more controversial
development of transgenic technologies used to produce genetically modiﬁed
organisms (GMO). Examples include agrobacterium-mediated transformation,
positive and negative selection systems for detecting transgenic plants, and





development of improved crop cultivars with novel agronomic/input






development of improved crop cultivars with novel quality-enhanced
traits for which consumers are willing to pay a price premium.
Because key enabling technologies provide the foundation for ongoing variety
improvement and consequent productivity gains in crop production, future
private investment in crop breeding will be threatened unless there is sufﬁ-





  Namely, traits that could not have been incorporated economically into improved vari-
eties by conventional plant breeding methods. 
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Whether by accident or by design, traditional arrangements for funding,
provision and access to these key enabling technologies treated them as
public goods. Public agencies that developed them did not seek to register
any proprietary interest in them. Nor did they charge for access to them,
and all plant breeding programs had open access to any key enabling tech-
nologies so produced. In addition, no attempt was made to recover the
costs of production by charging growers for the intellectual capital embed-




 Therefore, historically these key enabling
technologies were both non-rival in use, and non-price excludable, the two
essential attributes of true public goods.
Other sources of funding, most notably collective industry funding have
gradually substituted for a signiﬁcant proportion of government funding
over the past decade or so. Although, at least until recently, both plant
breeding and the development of key enabling technologies have continued
to be conducted primarily by the same public agencies. Furthermore, where
national industry organisations such as the Grains Research and Development
Corporation (GRDC) collectively funded the development of enabling
technologies for plant breeding, they implemented a system of national
coordination to control, if not eliminate, any tendency for duplication, and
to ensure that all plant breeding programs continued to enjoy free and open
access to these technologies.
These traditional, and in many ways ideal arrangements are changing
for a number of reasons. There has been reduced public funding for many
purposes, including rural research, for at least a decade or two. For rural
research, this has partly been a result of a growing perception that grain
growers have been the primary beneﬁciaries of these R&D programs. As a
result, many ‘public’ institutions are under pressure to become at least par-
tially self-funding, and are now charging for selected goods and services.
Research institutions are not immune to these pressures, and many public
R&D organisations are under pressure to commercialise discoveries, and to
convert some of their operations to a ‘cost recovery’, or even ‘for proﬁt’
basis. Patenting or otherwise protecting inventions are now common prac-
tice, as is the pursuit of opportunities to license technologies to the private
sector.
The capacity to use intellectual property rights to register propriety
interests in key enabling technologies as a basis for commercialisation has
expanded appreciably. The most signiﬁcant intellectual property rights for




  Typically, producers paid a nominal fee for improved varieties, which were made freely
available. Any fee in excess of the costs of seed multiplication recovered little if any of the
costs of breeding, and contributed nothing toward the cost of supporting research. 
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court judgements, legislative changes, and new or revised international agree-
ments have expanded the domain and scope of patents and plant breeders’
rights.
These extensions to the legal framework for intellectual property rights
have made it possible for ﬁrms to capture more of the value created by key
enabling technologies and plant breeding, thereby providing an incentive
for private investment in their development. In turn, this has contributed to
the trend to privatisation of crop breeding in Australia.
 
3. Policy challenges for privatised provision of essential 
plant breeding infrastructure
 
In the emerging world of competitive plant breeding, there are a number of
possible threats to the future level of investment in the creation of these key
enabling technologies, and to their efﬁcient production and utilisation. For
reasons already discussed, less rather than more public funds are likely to





. If there is no compensating funding from other
sources, it is inevitable that development of new enabling technologies and
innovation in plant breeding methods will decline.
One alternative in a world of privatised plant breeding would be for each
plant breeding ﬁrm to fund the production of key enabling technologies for
its own use. Arguably, this would be the worst possible outcome for two





 production by competing plant breeder of inputs
that are non-rival in use would involve wasteful duplication. In addition,
the level produced and utilised by any given ﬁrm would be suboptimal
because the value in use to any one ﬁrm would be a fraction of aggregate
value in use for all ﬁrms combined.




 case for some form of
collective funding and monopoly provision of key enabling technologies
by  a sole producer. Cooperative behaviour and shared funding by plant
breeding ﬁrms is one possibility. An actual example is the development of
molecular marker technology for canola breeding by Agriculture and
Agri-Food Canada that is funded by a global consortium of private and
public plant breeders. The provider charges an ‘up front’ subscription fee to
each consortium member, who contribute equally to the overall cost of




  As the race to sequence the human genome demonstrated, competition and consequent
duplication might be beneﬁcial if it enables the invention of more efﬁcient methods of
production. 
Privatised plant breeding 307
 
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
 
technology and can make unlimited use of it without further payment.
‘Free riding’ by non-members is prevented by legally binding conﬁdential-
ity clauses in the consortium agreement.
The consortium agreement treats the molecular marker technology as a
classic club good. In return for payment of a uniform ‘all or nothing’ fee,
exclusive access is available to club members, but subsequent usage is not
rationed by price. However, the ‘all or nothing’ price can ration utilisation
by potential users who are unwilling to pay for entry to the club.
Another potential problem with such arrangements is the transaction
costs involved in their establishment. Potential members differ markedly in
their capacity to beneﬁt from the molecular marker technology and, hence-
forth, in their willingness to pay for access to it. There are also likely to be
differences about many matters of detail, such as which types of molecular
markers to develop, how many molecular markers to produce, what limits,
if any, are to be put on use by consortium members and ownership rights.
In Australia, collective funding by grain growers through bodies, such as
GRDC, is an alternative source of funding for essential plant breeding
infrastructure that could continue to meet the needs of the grains industry.
For this club, membership is compulsory for all producers of mandate
grains, although the cost of membership is linked to the level of grain
production.
While potential beneﬁts are likely to be correlated with grain production
levels, for any given technology there will be signiﬁcant regional and crop
related differences in potential beneﬁts, as well as differences between
individual farmers in their ability to beneﬁt from any given technology. In
addition, there will be intertemporal differences between past, present and
future grain growers. Perhaps for these reasons, there is increasing pressure
for GRDC to commercialise those enabling technologies in which it invests,
and to recoup at least part of the cost of its investment by way of user fees.
Another possible problem to be discussed below is a potential conﬂict of
interest when GRDC invests in the development of key enabling technologies
as well as in some but not all plant breeding ﬁrms that are likely users of
such technology.
Private provision by a proﬁt maximising producer is yet another alterna-
tive. How much value is captured will depend on the extent to which market
forces and intellectual property rights enable providers to appropriate part
of the value created from enabling technologies by charging for the right to
access the technology. It is likely that continued funding for future production
will be forthcoming only if the returns from ‘private’ provision are sufﬁciently
attractive to maintain ongoing investment.
While a suitable funding source, sufﬁcient provision, and minimum wasteful
duplication in production are all causes for concern, efﬁcient utilisation of 
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key enabling technologies is another. Of particular concern is the pos-
sibility of signiﬁcant deadweight losses in efﬁciency from under-utilisation.
Under-utilisation is an inevitable consequence of charging for access unless
the producer can practice ﬁrst-degree price discrimination, and thereby
appropriate all of the beneﬁts generated by using the technology. If the
technology is under-utilised, a further consequence will be an inadequate
incentive to invest in the optimal level of production. The possible degree
of under-production of essential plant breeding infrastructure by a proﬁt
maximising monopoly provider is analysed in the next section.
To ensure efﬁcient utilisation, and to reap all of the beneﬁts from more
competition, all competing plant breeding ﬁrms need to have access to key
enabling technologies on equal terms and conditions. If utilisation by some
ﬁrms is advantaged relative to others because of commercial practice, or by
the institutional, policy, or legal framework; then competition among plant
breeders might not generate optimal outcomes. Conversely, if all ﬁrms com-
pete on a ‘level playing ﬁeld’, then only the most efﬁcient should survive.
There are obvious parallels here to National Competition Policy (NCP)
principles governing access to essential infrastructure (Productivity Com-
mission 1999, 2001). The aim of NCP is to facilitate effective competition in
those situations where competition between suppliers of goods and services
will result in lower prices, a wider range of products, and/or better service
for consumers. Where competition can be shown to not have these effects,
or where it endangers other social objectives, there are provisions to permit
non-competitive production.
Because the capacity of physical infrastructure also can be non-rival in
use so long as available capacity exceeds the demand for it, competition
might not be feasible or desirable in its provision. For instance, monopoly
provision of essential infrastructure is accepted in industries such as tele-
communications, air and rail transport, and electricity transmission.
However, shared use of such ‘bottleneck’ or ‘essential’ infrastructure facil-
ities might be necessary to facilitate efﬁcient competition in downstream
markets that use such infrastructure. Access regulation that aims to promote
competition in markets that use the services of ‘essential’ infrastructure
while preserving incentives to develop and maintain those facilities have
been developed to address concerns about denial of access and/or monopoly
pricing of access.
A case can be made that, as plant breeding becomes increasingly pri-
vatised, equivalent access regimes will need to be developed for those enabling
technologies that effectively are EPBI. Unless some rational access regime
is established, some of the potential beneﬁts from scientiﬁc discoveries
underpinning modern plant breeding might not be fully realised. In
common with NCP access regimes, the aim should be to promote full and 
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efﬁcient competition between plant breeders, while preserving adequate
incentives for investment in the ongoing development, maintenance and
provision of essential plant breeding infrastructure.
There is provision in Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act (TPA) 1974 for
a third party to gain access to an eligible infrastructure service by having a
service declared. However, such provisions are unlikely to be needed for
plant breeding for the Australian grains industry. As the key provider of
EPBI for crop breeding, GRDC is cognisant of the problem, and likely to
develop an undertaking as provided for in the TPA that speciﬁes terms and
conditions for access by all plant breeders.
In such an undertaking, two key issues will be the grounds (if any) for
denial of access or discriminatory pricing. One would be to deny access to,
or charge higher prices for EPBI to large multinational ‘life science’ ﬁrms.
A possible ground for doing so would be that these multinational ﬁrms
have access to other sources of EPBI from which Australian plant breeding
ﬁrms are excluded, and therefore would have an unfair competitive advantage
if they also had access to GRDC funded essential plant breeding infra-
structure. Whether this would be in the interests of Australia, the grains
industry at large, and/or growers is moot, and deserves further investigation.
Another possible ground would be that GRDC has, and plans to con-
tinue to invest in selected new and Australian owned plant breeding ﬁrms.
Fears have been expressed that they may decide to ‘protect’ such invest-




, denying access or discriminatory pricing for this reason would
seem to be an example of exploiting market power in order to beneﬁt
owned or related entities in upstream or downstream markets, and so con-
trary to NCP principles. Speciﬁcally, it would inhibit rigorous competition
in the downstream plant breeding market. Nevertheless, there may be
grounds based on the potential impact on Australia’s trading position for
treating plant breeding ﬁrms owned by overseas interests differently to
domestically owned ﬁrms.
 
4. Monopoly provision of EPBI given uniform pricing
 
The rest of the present paper is devoted to an analysis of the provision of
EPBI when a monopoly producer either chooses, or is obliged to provide
all plant breeders with access to essential plant breeding infrastructure on
the same terms and conditions. An ideal system of publicly funded and
produced essential plant breeding infrastructure that are freely and openly
provided to all plant breeders will be used as a ﬁrst best benchmark,
against which to assess the performance of alternative arrangements. This
assumes that the opportunity cost of public funding would be the same as 
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the opportunity cost of private funding, that best practice production tech-
nology is known, and that an ideal public system can correctly identify the
optimal level of provision for each key enabling technology. Whether the
historical system outlined above satisﬁed these conditions will not be invest-
igated in the present paper.
Molecular markers that could be used to generate a linkage map for a
valuable polygenic trait are a good example of essential plant breeding




 They are one of the









 Therefore, production by more than one
producer would involve wasteful duplication, and monopoly provision is
likely to be economically efﬁcient.
At the same time, intellectual property created by the invention of new
molecular markers can be protected as a trade secret, or by seeking patent
rights. Henceforth, at least partial price excludability is usually feasible even
though there are numerous instances where they have been made freely
available. Limits on the capacity for price exclusion are likely to depend
on the costs of imitation by competitors, the costs of detection of imitation,
and once detected, the costs of enforcing property rights against imitators.
Consequently, molecular markers provide a tangible and comprehensible case
study with which to analyse some of the likely consequences of adopting an
access regime based on non-discriminatory pricing.
In principle, a monopoly provider could maximise revenue by practising
ﬁrst degree price discrimination, and appropriating all of the beneﬁts gen-
erated by essential plant breeding infrastructure. Speciﬁcally, each user
would be charged their individual marginal willingness to pay for each
molecular marker. While such an outcome might be regarded as inequit-
able, it would be efﬁcient at least for the autarky case. In practice, the extent
to which perfect price discrimination can be practised will be constrained




  Molecular markers can be deﬁned as segments of a plant’s DNA that exhibit polymorph-
ism in relevant breeding populations (i.e., genotypic variation between individual members
of the population). By means of linkage studies, they can be statistically correlated with
particular allele(s) of the gene(s) of interest. One or more such genes can determine traits
of economic value, so the presence of particular molecular markers can be used to infer




  Produced output from molecular marker programs can include disembodied knowledge
about, inter alia, how to produce relevant primers for individual markers, estimates of
genetic distance between breeding lines that might be used as parents for breeding hybrids,
and QTL maps to assist in selecting for polygenic traits of interest. Use of these produced
units of knowledge by one plant breeder does not prevent use by any number of other plant
breeders. 
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users or third parties. Furthermore, and most importantly in the context
of this article, the application of competition policy principles gives
clear guidance to a monopoly provider such as GRDC that all poten-
tial users should be charged the same price to access molecular marker
technology.
In the remainder of the present paper, it will be assumed that a mono-
poly supplier charges all potential customers the same uniform price for
each and every molecular marker produced. It is clear from the literature
on excludable public goods that providers of such goods have considerable
latitude in setting prices even if they are committed to charging uniform
prices. Moreover, market pressures cannot be relied on to determine a
unique price. In order to maximise proﬁts given the constraint of uniform








appropriate as much of the potential aggregate net beneﬁt as possible.
Even if complete price excludability is feasible and costless, maximising the




selecting what is known as the optimal uniform price (OUP), deﬁned as




choosing the optimal level of output to produce given the marginal revenue
function associated with OUP.
Note that this pricing behaviour might not be ﬁrst best. It is however, a
plausible pricing policy for a monopolist seeking to maximise revenue sub-
ject to the constraint of conforming to competition policy principles.
Some of the consequences of a range of pricing strategies that might be









 (1981, 1985) and Burns and
Walsh (1981). The analysis below draws on some of their results. A key
ﬁnding was that, in contrast to markets for private goods, the frequency
distribution of individual demand functions is of critical importance in
determining returns to producers of joint goods. Consequently, the ﬁrms’
pricing practice needs to take into account the demand distribution when
analysing the supply of joint goods.
To quote Burns and Walsh (1981, pp. 168–169)
‘for monopoly production of price-excludable public goods, information
on aggregate demand is inadequate even under uniform per-unit pricing.
As each production unit can be fully and equally consumed by all indi-
viduals, output need never exceed that required to satisfy the highest 
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demand individual at any price. Moreover, the per-unit price faced by
each individual can be less than the marginal production cost since
many units are jointly consumed, but this would necessitate the ration-
ing of some high-demand individuals by output rather than by price.
Consequently, not only does the conventional aggregate demand curve
not deﬁne the relationship between price and output for joint goods,
in general it need not even deﬁne the relationship between price and
aggregate consumption. Operationally, … the producer of a joint
good will be concerned to identify the maximum revenue obtainable
from (various) given output levels, and this critically depends on the
composition of demand. Speciﬁcally, he will be interested in the number
of individuals who would purchase (at least) a certain quantity when
confronted with a particular (revenue maximising) price, since this
determines his marginal revenue. … This construct we term the
“distribution of demand”, or, more succinctly, the demand distribution.’
For any given plant breeder, the ‘value in use’ of each molecular marker
will be different because the genetic distance between the loci of each marker
and the genes of interest are different. Consequently, for each breeder
the net marginal user beneﬁt (NMUB) will be a declining function of
the number of molecular markers used. Furthermore, the willingness to
pay for any particular marker is likely to differ between breeders because





Figure 1 illustrates the demand distribution for a hypothetical case where
three plant breeding ﬁrms are the only potential customers for seven mole-
cular markers that could be used to select for a valuable polygenic trait.
The horizontal axis measures the number of selectable molecular markers
produced by the sole supplier, as well as the number used by each plant
breeder, while the vertical axis measures marginal user beneﬁt, both indi-
vidually and in aggregate. The ordering of molecular markers along the
horizontal axis is determined by their ‘quality’, as measured by their net
beneﬁt to plant breeders.
The demand functions for each of the three plant breeding ﬁrms are
depicted as a set of separate linear demand curves NMUB-PB1, NMUB-




  The direct variable costs of using molecular markers in a plant breeding program are
signiﬁcant, and need to be subtracted from the beneﬁts of doing so to arrive at the net mar-
ginal user beneﬁt from the knowledge component of the molecular marker that constitutes
the essential plant breeding infrastructure and is non-rival in use. 
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 Once produced, knowledge about these molecular markers
can be disseminated among potential users and used at zero net marginal
social cost. Henceforth, the combined marginal user beneﬁt potentially
available from full use of each molecular marker produced is obtained by
vertically summing the individual demand curves for all users. This curve is
denoted the potential aggregate marginal beneﬁt (PAMB) function because
it assumes that there will be full use of produced output.
For simplicity, assume constant marginal costs of producing molecular
marker knowledge, as denoted by the horizontal line MC. As illustrated in
ﬁgure 1, it is socially optimal to produce four molecular markers. If these four
molecular markers are made available without cost to all plant breeders by some
undeﬁned but costless mechanism, potential aggregate net beneﬁt (PANB) will
be equal to the shaded area below the PAMB curve and above the marginal
cost of production. This area depicts the maximum potential net social surplus
achievable given full utilisation of the optimal level of four molecular
markers. This idealised outcome will serve as a benchmark against which to
assess the impact of private provision of essential plant breeding infrastructure




  These functions are deﬁned to measure net marginal willingness to pay for each unit of
knowledge given that the net marginal cost of utilisation is zero. If the marginal cost of util-
isation is greater than zero, then as noted above it can be deducted from the gross marginal
willingness to pay to utilise each molecular marker to obtain the marginal willingness to
pay for the knowledge embodied in each molecular marker.
Figure 1 Optimal provision of essential plant breeding infrastructure (EPBI).  NMUB, net
marginal user beneﬁt; MC, marginal cost; PB, plant breeder. 
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Note that in the case illustrated in ﬁgure 1, even if the enabling marker
technology is provided free, plant breeder 1 will only use three molecular
markers because the direct cost of using the fourth available marker would
exceed the gross beneﬁt of doing so. In contrast, use by breeders 2 and 3
will be constrained by availability of produced markers as the NMUB of
the fourth molecular marker is greater than zero. Hence, full utilisation
does not necessarily involve all breeders using all available markers.
In general, there will be incomplete utilisation of produced output when plant
breeders are charged a positive uniform price to obtain access to molecular
markers. Hence, the PAMB function will overestimate realised aggregate
marginal beneﬁt (RAMB), deﬁned as the sum of marginal beneﬁts from
actual utilisation. Recall that actual use may be rationed either by price or by
availability when a uniform price is charged for access to molecular markers.
For reasons to be discussed below, the actual level of EPBI produced by
a revenue maximising monopolist will be less than the optimal level.
Figure  2 illustrates the aggregate net beneﬁt appropriated from plant
breeder 2 given an arbitrary and suboptimal number of produced molecu-
lar markers – denoted as actual production of EPBI in ﬁgure 2 – for which
any given uniform price is charged. Realised beneﬁt is the area under the
individual demand curve for plant breeder 2, and up to the amount of
molecular markers actually used at the uniform price, in this case 2 units.
Figure 2 Utilisation by PB2 of essential plant breeding infrastructure (EPBI) at uniform price.
NMUB, net marginal user beneﬁt; PB, plant breeder; UP, uniform price. 
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As the uniform price is charged for all units of output, the monopoly pro-
vider will only be able to appropriate part of this area. Speciﬁcally, revenue





  leaving the area labelled ‘User beneﬁt’ as a net beneﬁt for plant
breeder 2.
Note that plant breeder 2 will under-utilise molecular markers so long as
price rationing results in actual utilisation being less than the produced
number of molecular markers. In ﬁgure 2, this loss is depicted by the area
labelled ‘PB2 loss as a result of under-utilisation’. Furthermore, to the
extent that plant breeder 2 would have used more molecular markers than
the produced amount if they were freely available, there will be a loss
of potential welfare solely because of ‘under-production’. Such a loss, which
is depicted in ﬁgure 2 by the area labelled ‘PB2 loss as a result of under-
production’, is part of the deadweight loss of privatising molecular marker
production, even though it is not a loss of potentially appropriable beneﬁts.
As drawn in ﬁgure 2, the maximum willingness-to-pay by plant breeder 1




 Consequently, the uniform price effectively
excludes PB1 from using any molecular markers, and the monopolist will
earn no revenue from this plant breeder. Conversely, availability of pro-
duced molecular markers will ration use by plant breeder 3, so revenue
from breeder 3 will equal the product of total produced quantity by the
uniform price. Total revenue from uniform pricing is the sum of the beneﬁts
appropriated from all plant breeders.
The magnitude of each area identiﬁed above will not only be different for
each plant breeder, but will depend on both the quantum of molecular
markers produced, and on the uniform price charged. Conditional on the
latter two variables, aggregate revenue, user beneﬁt not appropriated, and
welfare losses as a result of under-utilisation and to under-production can
be obtained by summing over the separate measures for all users.
To  proceed more formally with an analysis of the monopoly provision
and pricing of a joint good like molecular markers, the same set of simpli-
fying assumptions used by Burns and Walsh (1981) are adopted here. The
starting point is the speciﬁcation of the demand distribution, deﬁned as
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, refers only to the
number of users who would consume all of the available amount of the joint good, and
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which denotes maximum willingness to pay by user n for incremental unit
of output q.
















 denotes total number of potential users,
Q denotes quantity demanded at price zero by the most demanding user,
and also denotes maximum possible production, and P denotes maximum
willingness-to-pay by the most demanding user.
In order to ensure mathematical tractability, Burns and Walsh (1981) fur-
ther assumed that the individual demand curves that make up this demand
distribution are linear, and have identical slopes.
12 Lastly, it is assumed that




Derivation of potential aggregate marginal beneﬁts, PAMB(q) for produced
output q yields:
(2)
Optimal production of molecular markers in an ideal world, q_OPT, is
obtained by solving for q when PAMB(q) is equal to the marginal cost of
production, µ,
(3)
By deﬁning a capacity production cost index, ψ = 2 · µ/(P*N), and substituting
this variable into equation (3) and dividing it by Q, a normalised equation
can be obtained as follows:
(4)
12 Note that this assumption ensures that individual demand curves in the demand distribu-
tion do not intersect. Eliminating the possibility of intersecting individual demand curves
makes the analysis much more tractable.
13 Note that this is equivalent to assuming that maximum willingness-to-pay by the n, the
user, p(n), is uniformly distributed on the interval U(0, … , P); and q(n), is uniformly distributed
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As proposed, this ideal output q_OPT, can be used as a benchmark against
which to compare the monopoly provision of essential plant breeding infra-
structure when the monopolist charges a per unit uniform price to access
any or all produced output.
To derive total revenue, TR(qa, pu), that the monopolist can appropriate
when potential users are charged a per unit uniform price, pu, to access any
number of molecular markers up to a limit of the amount produced, qa,
note that users for whom:
• p(n, 0) < pu are totally excluded by price, so the monopolist derives no
revenue from this group of potential users,
• N · (pu/P) < n < N · (pu/P + qa/Q), appropriated revenue equals pu · Q · (n/
N-pu/P),
• n > N · (pu/P + qa/Q), appropriated revenue equals pu · Q.
Total appropriated revenue can be obtained by summing the product of
pu and the relevant quantity of molecular markers used by each group of




For any given level of production qa, the optimal uniform price, OUP(qa),
is deﬁned as the uniform price that maximises revenue for that level of output.
Setting the derivative of (6) with respect to pu equal to zero, and solving for
OUP(qa) yields:
(7)
Substituting OUP(qa) from (7) back into (6) for pu yields total revenue,
TR_OUP (qa), for qa given optimal uniform pricing:
(8)
and the equivalent marginal revenue function, MR_OUP (qa) is:
TR qa pu pu Q n N pu P dn pu qa dn
Np u P
Np u P qa Q
Np u Pqa Q
N







⋅+   













































The impact of privatising the production of essential plant breeding infra-
structure on the produced level of output can be assessed by setting the
above function equal to marginal cost, µ, and solving for proﬁt maximising
output, q_OUP(µ):
(11)
Again, this equation can be normalised by substituting ø for 2 · µ/(P*N),
and dividing by Q, as follows:
(12)
and the ratio of q_OUP(µ) to q_OPT is:
(13)
Note that equations (4), (12), and (13) all depend solely on the capacity
production cost index (ψ = 2 · µ/(P*N)), deﬁned as the ratio of the marginal
cost of production to the product of two of the three parameters of the
demand distribution, N and P.
In ﬁgure 3 below, normalised equation 4 for optimal output in an ideal
world, q_OPT/Q, and normalised equation 12 for monopoly output given
uniform pricing, q_OUP(µ)/Q, as well as the ratio of the latter to the
former, are plotted against the capacity production cost index, ψ = 2 · µ/
(P*Q) to illustrate the impact of privatisation on production of essential
plant breeding infrastructure.
Note that optimal output for molecular markers declines monotonically
from Q, which is the quantity demanded at price zero by the most demanding
user, and one of the limits of the demand distribution, to zero as the capacity
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However, the proﬁt maximising level of output for a monopolist con-
strained to charging a uniform per unit price will be only 67 per cent of Q
even when the capacity production cost index is zero. Moreover, monopoly
output monotonically declines to zero by the time that the capacity produc-
tion cost index reaches 0.5, which is half of the upper bound of the capacity
production cost index.
The ratio of monopoly provision of molecular markers to optimal output
in an ideal world never exceeds 75 per cent even when the marginal cost of
production is relatively inexpensive, and it declines rapidly to 0 per cent by
the time that the capacity production cost index reaches 0.5. In other
words,  the degree of under production of essential plant breeding infra-
structure caused by privatisation becomes more severe as production costs
become relatively more expensive. Clearly, the values derived above depend
on assumptions about the demand distribution, and on the lack of con-
sideration of price discrimination. Further work is planned to investigate
how sensitive the results are to these key assumptions.
5. Conclusions
Productivity gains from plant breeding are underpinned by enabling tech-
nologies developed from scientiﬁc discoveries. Once produced, the knowledge
Figure 3 Optimal versus monopoly provision of essential plant breeding infrastructure (EPBI)
under optimal uniform price (OUP).320 B. Lindner
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component of enabling technologies are effectively non-rival in use by plant
breeders. Consequently, this knowledge component can be thought of as
EPBI. Traditionally, such inputs were non-proprietary, provision was pub-
licly funded, and access by public plant breeding programs was both open
and free of any charges. As a result, there was no ﬁnancial impediment to
full utilisation of EPBI.
As plant breeding becomes increasingly privatised, two threats to future
productivity gains are the efﬁcient provision of adequate levels of modern
EPBI, and under-utilisation of such EPBI as is produced. It is widely
recognised that competitive supply of joint goods normally will involve
wasteful duplication, but there also are potential problems with monopoly
provision of EPBI. In keeping with NCP principles, access to EPBI by
competing plant breeders should be open and on equal terms, so as to
promote full and efﬁcient competition in downstream markets, while pre-
serving adequate incentives for investment in the ongoing development of
EPBI. However, even if denial of access does not prove to be a problem, the
impact of proﬁt maximising pricing by a monopoly provider on potential
losses from under-production, and on under-utilisation by plant breeders
of produced EPBI, are essential issues that need to be considered in the
formulation of any access regime. In particular, pricing practices of a private
provider are integral to the key issues for any access regime; namely, ade-
quate provision and sufﬁcient utilisation.
The impact on level of production of EPBI was analysed when a monopoly
provider chooses, or is constrained to charging a single uniform price to all
plant breeders for each and every molecular marker produced. For molecular
markers that are low cost relative to the parameters of the demand distri-
bution, under-production might be as little as 25 per cent. However, once
the capacity production cost index rises, the degree of under-production
increases dramatically. Ideally, EPBI would be produced for values of the
cost index up to 1.0, but a monopoly provider would not produce any EPBI
if the capacity production cost index exceeded 0.5. This demonstrates that
monopoly provision always falls short, and often far short of the optimal
output that an ideal and omniscient publicly ﬁnanced provider would produce.
Many questions require further research, including determination of the
nature of plant breeders’ demand distribution for molecular markers, and
the sensitivity of the above results to this and other key assumptions used
in the analysis. For instance, a private provider might employ other pricing
strategies that may or may not be uniform, and might include some degree
of price discrimination. Alternatively, EPBI could continue to be produced
by a collectively funded industry organisation, such as the GRDC, which
need not set prices for access to produced EPBI at revenue maximising
levels. In fact, the GRDC currently makes EPBI freely available to plantPrivatised plant breeding 321
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
breeders. This leads to more interesting questions concerning the welfare
effects on grain growers, and whether they are better or worse off from con-
tinuing to fund provision of EPBI through the GRDC. Research into these
issues will require a method to quantify the relative magnitude of the loss of
potential beneﬁts as a result of under-production, and to under-utilisation,
of excludable public goods, including essential plant breeding infrastructure.
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